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Description of CHPV and GV

Introduction
Analogy
Weightings
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Counting
Outcomes
Party-List
Summary

Evaluations of CHPV and GV

Ranked Ballot

Introduction (RB)
General Criteria
Majority Criteria
Clones & Teaming
Teaming Thresholds
Summary (RB)

Party-List

Introduction (PL)
Diagrams & Maps
CHPV Maps
Optimality
Party Cloning
Proportionality
Summary (PL)

Comparisons of CHPV with other voting systems

Single-Winner

Introduction (SW)
Plurality (FPTP)
Borda Count
Geometric Voting
Positional Voting
Condorcet Methods
AV (IRV)
Plur. Rule Methods
Summary (SW)

Multiple-Winner

Introduction (MW)
STV
Party-List
PL ~ Hare
PL ~ Droop
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ D'Hondt
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ Sainte-Laguë
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
Mixed Member Sys
Summary (MW)

Conclusions

Ranked Ballot CHPV
Party-List CHPV

General

Table of Contents

Map Construction

Table of Contents

Mathematical Proofs

Table of Contents
Notation & Formats

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Home > Proofs > General Criteria > EG3
Last Revision: New on 25 Feb 2013

Mathematical Proofs: General Criteria

Proof EG3: GV (any r) fails the Reversal Symmetry Criterion

GV Reversal Symmetry Table

Scenario: Three candidates A, B and C are nominated for a single-winner GV (any r) election in which six voters cast their three preferences as stated in the upper table opposite. The resultant candidate tallies (T) are therefore as follows:

Now consider the case where the strict rank ordering of the three preferences on each of the six ballots is reversed as stated in the lower table opposite. Notice that the candidate tallies here are identical to the ones above. Therefore, the election result is in no way altered by this reversal.

GV would not meet the reversal symmetry criterion where one candidate (A here) is still the winner when all the ballots have reversed preferences. To prove that A does win before and after the reversal, the tally for A must be greater than the tally for B and the one for C. The two equations are defined and simplified below.

Proof EG3 part 1

The two simplified equations above are in fact identical. Therefore, if this tally comparison equation is true for any valid value of r, then GV does not satisfy the reversal symmetry criterion. This equation is further simplified below.

Proof EG3 part 2

As x is a non-zero positive number (no higher than one), then x2 is also a non-zero positive one and the above equation is always true. Hence, for any valid value of r, the tally for A is invariably greater than that for either B or C so candidate A always wins whether the ballots are reversed or not.


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