Contents

Description of CHPV and GV

Introduction
Analogy
Weightings
Voting
Counting
Outcomes
Party-List
Summary

Evaluations of CHPV and GV

Ranked Ballot

Introduction (RB)
General Criteria
Majority Criteria
Clones & Teaming
Teaming Thresholds
Summary (RB)

Party-List

Introduction (PL)
Diagrams & Maps
CHPV Maps
Optimality
Party Cloning
Proportionality
Summary (PL)

Comparisons of CHPV with other voting systems

Single-Winner

Introduction (SW)
Plurality (FPTP)
Borda Count
Geometric Voting
Positional Voting
Condorcet Methods
AV (IRV)
Plur. Rule Methods
Summary (SW)

Multiple-Winner

Introduction (MW)
STV
Party-List
PL ~ Hare
PL ~ Droop
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ D'Hondt
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
PL ~ Sainte-Laguë
~ Maps Opt PC Pro
Mixed Member Sys
Summary (MW)

Conclusions

Ranked Ballot CHPV
Party-List CHPV

General

Table of Contents

Map Construction

Table of Contents

Mathematical Proofs

Table of Contents
Notation & Formats

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Home > Comparisons > Positional Voting > Page 6 of 10
Last Revision: 10 Apr 2023

Comparisons: Positional Voting 6

Bias Indices for other Example Voting Vectors

Although GV(r) can represent any positional voting system between Plurality and the Borda Count when only three candidates are nominated, it can only substitute for a few vectors when more candidates are fielded. Three alternative systems are investigated here in order to compare and contrast them to GV(r).

The voting system employed by the state of Nauru is an important positional voting one in its own right. The other two are called the 'Square' and 'Factorial' vectors due to their respective weightings formula. Neither is known to be used in practice but both are valid and illuminating methods. The standard formula for the nth weighting of the vector with N candidates and the standard vector itself for each of the three alternatives to GV(r) are given below.

The normalized vector and the equations for Σ, PIV and CIV are all determined in exactly the same manner as for GV(r) or any other vector. The resultant CIV values for the three alternative systems are shown in the table below.

Refer to proof CV4
Consensus Index Table for Example Vectors

As with GV(r), when there are only two candidates the alternative vectors all produce the same wholly polarized election outcome. For all three vectors, their CIV value rises as N increases and it does so more slowly as N becomes larger. The Factorial vector converges very rapidly towards its ultimate value. It is initially more consensual than the Nauru vector but this reverses when more than five candidates are nominated. The Nauru vector is however consistently more consensual than the Square one for any number of candidates.

Like GV(r) vectors, the equations for Σ, PIV and CIV when N becomes very large and tends to infinity are again greatly simplified here. The weightings used for Σ in the Nauru vector form a divergent series and so Σ itself tends to infinity. However, those for both the Square and Factorial vectors form a convergent series so a finite value for Σ emerges. The resultant values for Σ and CIV for each alternative are provided below.

Refer to proof CV4

Another example of an existing positional voting system is the one employed by the European Song Contest where many more than ten songs compete against each other. It does not employ a formula but its weighting vector is fully defined as 12, 10, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0 for all the remaining songs. The sum of its normalized weights is 58/12 and so its CIV = 46/58 = 0.793. It is therefore a largely consensual system.


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